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There is currently a perhaps surprising closeness in the relationship of Turkey
and Russia. Historically, of course, the two almost defined themselves in terms of
each other. Much Russian history was written in the same fashion as Spanish
history used to be, of a centuries long struggle against Islam. Even in Soviet
times, the ‘Tatar Yoke’—Mongol oppression from the mid-13th to the late 15th
century—was a standard theme. Turkish historiography concerning Russia is
surprisingly weak, given that Russia, Tsarist or Soviet, was the great enemy. This
historic opposition does of course require qualification, and peoples with the
geopolitical closeness of Turks and Russians could hardly have been living on the
same borders for half a millennium without absorbing much from each other.
The famous Russian expression, ‘the Tatar yoke’, turns out to have been an
invention of the later 16th century, when the Orthodox Church used it as a power
play against Ivan the Terrible, who expanded his absolutist power in alliance
with Tatars. On the other hand, the Ottoman history does probably not recall its
endless struggle with the northern neighbour in glory. The two nations were
contenders on a wide geopolitical setting, namely, Caucasus, Balkans and the
Black Sea. Although Ottomans had difficult times at the expense of expanding
Russian power, there were also historical moments, like 1838, when the Sublime
Porte sought the assistance of the Russian Empire to subdue its uprising
(Egyptian) subjects.
The rise of the Russian Empire coincided with the decay of Ottoman power.
Starting from the late 18th century, the powers occasionally were at war until the
end of the First World War, which was instrumental in helping Serbia, Greece and
Bulgaria to establish their independent states. The Turkish state usually resorted
to diplomacy and the alignments in the international system to block Russian
aspirations (such as 1856/Crimean War–European coalition, 1878/St Stefanos–
Berlin International Conference). The Russian Empire usually pursued the role of
protector of Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire and generally approached
Turkey as the major stumbling block en route to the Mediterranean.
In the first quarter of the 20th century, both states had undergone dramatic
change. Declarations of Constitutional monarchies in Russia (1905) and in the
Ottoman Empire (1908) were followed by tremendous losses of both countries
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during the First World War. This resulted in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
(1917) and the Turkish War of Independence (1919–23) and the declaration of the
Republican regime in Turkey in 1923.1 The nationalist revolutionaries of Ankara
were among the first to recognize the communist revolutionaries of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. The Turkish resistance movement led by Atatürk
sought help from Lenin’s Soviets to continue the war of survival against the
occupation forces of Greece and Britain. Lenin extended limited support to the
Turkish struggle against the ‘imperialist’ forces2 (5 per cent of the Turkish
defence budget came from the USSR).
Much later (and this is of some importance in what follows) Turkish
nationalists, after the First World War, cooperated with the Russian
revolutionaries and even, in a sense, owed victory to that alliance. There was
at one stage a square in Izmir named after Voroshilov, who had come on a state
visit (the photographic record of which is in the Atatürk Museum at Ankara
today). Historically, Turkey had been the weaker element. However, in the 1980s
her economy progressed to the point at which a gravitational effect on its nearest
and most important neighbour was bound to show.3
Where does the future lie? There are various possible perspectives. There is a
military one. Turkey has been a member of NATO for more than 50 years. There
has been huge investment in this, and, as Turkey has grown substantially in
military strength and capability (it now manufactures F-16s and owns the largest
and most functional fleet on the Black Sea), so Turkey’s role in NATO has grown,
not necessarily in a manner agreeable to Russian taste. However, it should also be
noted, with the end of the cold war, NATO has been developed into some other
platform, not very much responding to the security concerns of Turkey.
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey has experienced undeclared arms embargoes from
her Western allies, especially from Germany and the USA in different forms. For
example, Germany has criticized the use of German weapons in the war against
terror in South-eastern Turkey. On the other hand, the USA has refused to
transfer any major military–technical technology to Turkey for most of the
projects, especially the attack helicopter one. So, in the second half of the 1990s,
Turkey has allied itself with Israel. Through this very important alliance, Turkey
has achieved important modernization projects of the Turkish armed forces as
well as considerable technology transfer. But the political message of this alliance
was more important. Through this alliance, Turkey successfully imposed a huge
pressure on Syria, the chief financier and supporter of Kurdish separatist
terrorism in Turkey. As a result, Syrian authorities were forced to deport Öcalan
at the end of the 1990s. From the 1990s until 20044 Turco-Israeli cooperation has
not attracted any major reaction from Russia. On the other hand, from 1997 on,
Israeli companies have taken an active role in adopting Russian arms to NATO
standards, especially in avionics. At least that was the case in the Turkish bid for
attack helicopters, and the Israeli–Russian project of Ka-521.
1B. Oran, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I
(1919–1980), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 155–177.
2S. Bilge, ‘An analysis of Turkish–Russian relations’, Perceptions, June–August 1997, p. 71.
3Note here: a convenient introduction to these themes is N. Stone, ‘Turkey in the Russian mirror’,
in L. Erickson and M. Erickson (eds), Russia: War, Peace and Diplomacy, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
London, 2005, pp. 86–101.































Although Turkey was a member of NATO during the cold war, her relations
with the West were not problem-free. From 1964 onwards, from the Johnson
letter of that year, the Soviet Union became the Mecca to be turned to, especially
on matters related to the Cyprus crisis. With Soviet aid a good part of Turkish
heavy industrial infrastructure was built between 1965 and 1980. The
Soviet alternative was very important especially during the embargo years
after the Cyprus war of 1974.5
Turkey and Russia have a number of issues on which both countries have
taken diametrically opposing views. For instance, Georgia has been included into
the economic, cultural and military hinterland of Turkey since the early 1990s.
The Georgian army trained by Turkish instructors, its economy surviving with
transit reserves, etc.6 That was not pleasing Russians. Some other issues
include(d) the Bosnia problem, Kosovar independence, Nagorno-Karabagh,
territorial integrity of Georgia and some other former Soviet states.
Azerbaijan, for reasons of traditional ethnic, linguistic and cultural bonds, is
almost required to have close relations with Turkey, and its oil and gas have
already started to flow along the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude oil pipeline. There
is also a railway currently under construction from Kars to Baku via Tbilisi,
bypassing Armenia. As the Georgian–Azerbaijani relationship with Armenia
becomes difficult, there are obvious reasons for the Turkish – Russian
relationship to reflect this. There are moreover very ugly problems: PKK
terrorism for Ankara and Chechen terrorism for Moscow, which have made, and
still might make, for complications in the Turco-Russian relationship.
There is an obvious economic perspective as well, the growth of trade and
investment. Turkey has been emerging as a manufacturing centre of considerable
weight in the global economy. Industrialization, to some degree a consequence of
the displacement of German factories, is now reaching beyond the original
heartlands in the west and north-west, and affects areas far into the interior, such as
Adana, Gaziantep and Kayseri. Since 2001, the number of registered motor vehicles
has increased by almost 50 per cent (from 7 to 10 million), industrial production is
rising at an annual average of 8 per cent, the country’s foreign trade volume has
tripled and per capita electricity net consumption has risen by around 50 per cent.7
Turkey, to sustain growth, needs secure and affordable energy (and more
efficient use of that). Russia in the last two decades has emerged as the primary
energy supplier for Turkey. In return Turkey is paying its energy bill in world
prices, in cash and on time. This is reflected in growing trade figures and has had
a visible impact on the extent and content of the political relationship.
There have been several studies of this, emphasizing one aspect or another.
Sezer (2001) highlights a certain contradiction, in that state relations have
proceeded smoothly, on the basis of economic ties, whereas fear and distrust shape
attitudes among the political elite. Torbakov (2005) thinks that diminishing
security concerns, together with natural gas, will radically alter the bilateral
5M. C. Aslan, The Cyprus Question in the Making and the Attitude of the Soviet Union Towards the
Cyprus Question (1960–1974), Bilkent University, Ankara, 2008, pp. 51–77.
6‘Saakashvili pulled the trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia’, SETA Policy Brief, August
2008, available at the following website: ,http://www.setav.org/document/Policy_Brief_No_20_
Hasan_Ali_Karasar.pdf. .
7Statistical Year Book, Turkish Statistical Institute, 2006, p. 195.






























relationship. Akturk (2006)8 stresses the convergence of the regional political
agendas of the two countries, an outcome of the alteration in the power balance
which developed in Turkey’s favour in the 1990s. Hill and Taspinar (2006) even
suggest that a common disillusionment over US policies in the Middle East,
together with expanding trade, and cooperation over terrorism and the Black Sea
are bringing Turkey and Russia closer. They do, however, refer to this as a ‘strange
coupling’. Jensen looks at the question of Putin’s successors, sees faction-fighting
among energy lobbies and reckons that Gazprom’s increasing weight in Russian
domestic politics will limit Turkey’s ability to act as an energy hub. Akgun (2007)9
similarly points to the role of Gazprom as a pivot for Russian foreign policy and to
the over-reliance of European countries on Russia as a primary energy supplier. In a
recent study, Yarnik (2007) analyses the nature of renewed Turco-Russian
cooperation and underlines the rising trust in security matters, the booming trade
and Vladimir Putin’s aim to give economic relations priority in Russian foreign
policy. Winrow (2004, 2007) in similar ways analyses the impact of this closer
relationship with Russia on Turkey’s relations with NATO and the USA in the
wider Black Sea region. He foresees closer energy ties between Ankara and
Moscow and believes that this might complicate Turkey’s relations with the USA
and the European Union (EU). Thus, in all such analyses, the booming trade
relations between the two nations emerge as a decisive factor, transforming what a
leading commentator, Dmitri Trenin (1997)10, called a ‘schizophrenic’ relationship.
The present study examines whether trade and energy considerations can bring
about a real rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. In contrast to other
analyses, it concludes that the future of Turkish–Russian cooperation does not
necessarily lie in the field of energy. Today, we observe a temporary warming of
political relations, one that depends on a variety of factors, some of which are
themselves somewhat unstable. In a multi-polar setting, and given the
fundamental interdependence that the natural gas trade involves, the two nations
will of course continue to cooperate as and when their regional foreign-policy
agendas converge. But energy policy in itself is more likely to cause problems.
This study has three main parts. The first section looks at the changing political
and economic fundamentals of the 2000s. The second section analyses the trade and
energy policies of the two countries in the political context. The third section
considers how durable and strong a Russo-Turkish partnership may be in the future.
Changing fundamentals of the political and economic context of the 2000s
The end of the cold war is universally agreed to be the starting point in the new
Russo-Turkish relationship. Ideological differences went by the board; the
prevailing military confrontation was replaced by lesser ones (such as the
Chechen conflict, or the clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabagh) in the 1990s. In a multi-polar world, it was likely that Russia and
8S. Akturk, ‘Turkish–Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992–2002)’, Turkish Studies, 7(3),
September 2006, pp. 345–346, accessed at the EBSCO Host on 28 April 2009.
9S. Akgun, ‘The Russian Federation as an energy supplier’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 6(2), Summer
2007, p. 29, accessed at the EBSCO Host on 28 April 2009.
10D. Trenin, ‘Russia and Turkey: A cure for schizophrenia’, Perceptions, Journal of International































Turkey, given the problems of their neighbourhood, would consider an overall
understanding that would obviate the endless political troubles that took such
attention and energy in the 1990s.
Another important and obvious consequence of the end of the cold war was
the victory of liberal politico-economic thought over communism. The purport of
this was that in the new world order social and economic strength, not military or
ideological factors, would define spheres of influence. As Nye said (2004), love,
contrary to Machiavelli, matters as much as fear: power would not rest on the
number of nuclear warheads or on the global reach of military strength but on the
ability of a state’s culture, political values and foreign policies to change
preferences in other states.11 Kissinger12 (2001) also points to the changing nature
of power in the post-cold war era, saying that ‘Power has changed: Saudi Arabia
has it without an army whereas the Soviet Union had it without an economy.’
But, beyond the ending of the cold war, other matters have affected Russo-
Turkish relations.
Failed expectations of the 1990s
Turkey’s self-proclaimed role to fill the post-Soviet vacuum in parts of Eurasia
was a failure. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Turkey aspired to
help in the transition of the newly independent states of the Caucasus and
Central Asia on the basis of the Turkish model. There were significant increases
in cultural relations, student exchanges and high profile summits, but Turkey’s
financial weakness and her pre-occupation with internal economic and political
problems, in particular political Islam and the PKK, played a decisive role in this
failure. By the end of the 1990s, it was clear that Turkey was far from being a
model. She lacked the resources to be a locomotive country. Stabilization of the
limit and scope of Turkish penetration in the Caucasus and Central Asia had a
relaxing effect on hostile Russian public opinion.13 Turkish foreign policy
gradually adjusted to this reality and with the candidacy status endorsed in 2002,
membership of the EU became Turkey’s most important foreign-policy goal.
In similar vein, Russia’s desire to retain its hegemonic role over the former Soviet
space also failed in the 1990s. Many of the Eastern European countries were
integrated into NATO and became members of the EU. Whereas in 1993 the Russian
foreign-policy concept14 called for a unified military strategic space in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in 2000, the revised foreign-policy
concept15 gave Russian economic interests in the international arena priority.
The new foreign-policy concept placed Russia in the multi-polar system of
international relations, of shifting and sometimes conflicting interests, that is the
11J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, pp. 4–6.
12H. Kissinger, The National Interest, No. 64, Summer 2001, p. 13.
13V. I. Danilov, ‘Some features of Russian–Turkish relations in the 1990s’, Perceptions, December
2001–February 2002, p. 18.
14The foreign policy concept is available at the following website: ,http://countrystudies.us/
russia/77.htm. accessed on 14 January 2008.
15The revised foreign policy concept is available at ,http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/
doctrine/econcept.htm. , accessed on 14 January 2008.






























world’s reality. Military power, yes of course, but anevergreater role would accrue to
economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological and information factors.
Changing and converging regional foreign-policy agendas
US activism in the CIS and the Middle East has caused alarm in both Turkey and
Russia.
In fact, Putin’s reign marked a decisive shift in the foreign-policy choices of
Russia, and a departure from the earlier idea of inevitable competition with the
USA and the EU. Putin was willing to recognize the global leadership of the USA
in return for Russia acquiring a special role within the old Soviet space.16
However, the USA, although exploiting Russian support in Afghanistan and
Central Asia, was hesitant to conclude such a deal. The US and Russian rift
deepened during the war on Iraq, during which Russia joined forces with the
coalition of the unwilling, namely, France and Germany. Besides, the multi-
coloured revolutions in Ukraine17 and elsewhere, including Central Asia, dashed
the foundations of Putin’s US policy.18 They appeared as unwarranted intrusions.
Turkey was similarly disturbed by US military activism in Iraq. The decisive
break in relations occurred in March 2003, when the Turkish parliament turned
down the US request for opening a northern front in Iraq, via Turkish territory.
Since then, US–Turkish political relations have worsened: the USA cooperated
with the autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, which Ankara regarded
with mistrust.19
Besides, Russo–Turkish cooperation in the Black Sea region also seems to be
growing, given the apparent American eagerness to penetrate this area. In 2005,
the USA attempted to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as
an observer; this was stopped by joint Turco-Russian action.20 A second US
attempt was made in 2006 to extend the NATO-led Operation Active Endeavor to
the Black Sea, a proposal rejected, though for different reasons, by Russia and
Turkey. The USA thereupon enlisted Romanian and Bulgarian support,
establishing military bases covering the Black Sea.21
Another area of convergence is the foreign policy of the two countries
towards Iran.22 Both Turkey and Russia have sought to maintain economic
16D. Trenin, ‘Russia leaves the West’, Foreign Affairs, 85(4), July–August 2006, p. 4, accessed at the
EBSCO Host on 10 January 2008.
17British Helsinki Human Rights Group provides a forum for the few dissenting voices in the West
on the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. These are available at the following web
addresses: ‘Georgia 2003: the revolution of guns not roses’, ,http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.
asp?CountryID¼10&ReportID¼207&keyword¼Georgia. ; ‘Ukraine’s clockwork Orange
Revolution’, ,http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID¼22&ReportID¼
241&ChapterID¼737&next¼next&keyword¼Ukraine. .
18D. Trenin, ‘Russia leaves the West’, Foreign Affairs, 85(4), July–August 2006, p. 4, accessed at the
EBSCO Host on 10 January 2008.
19F. Hill and O. Taspinar, ‘Turkey and Russia: axis of the excluded?’, Survival, 48(1), Spring 2006,
pp. 84–98.
20‘ABD Karadenize Usleniyor’, Radikal, 12 July 2005.
21A. Cohen and I. Conway, ‘US strategy in the Black Sea region’, 13 December 2006, available at the
following website: ,http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bgl990.cfm. .
22I. Torbakov, ‘Turkey and post-Soviet Eurasia: seeking a regional power status’, Insight Turkey,































relations with Iran despite US pressure to sever ties. Turkey wishes to sell Iranian
gas to Europe via the Nabucco pipeline and reached an understanding in August
2007 to develop the South Pars natural gas fields (Persian Gulf); Russia has been
selling military technology and civilian nuclear capability to Iran.
Domestic stability and leadership change
After the troubled decade in office of Boris Yeltsin, the Russian presidency passed
in 2000 to Vladimir Putin, already Prime Minister. His election manifesto made
three major promises to the Russian electorate: a decent life, a strong state and the
rule of law, which were what Russians most needed after that decade of
traumatic social and economic transition. Putin also explicitly linked Russia’s
world role and the condition of her economy.23
Russia, her finances in hopeless disarray in 1998 due to a decade of collapse,
plundering, corruption and money flight, entered upon a period of sustained
growth during the Putin years, thanks to realistic macro-economic planning, to a
tightening of fiscal policiesand most importantly to climbing oil and gas prices. With
the new wealth Putin was able to strengthen his domestic position in various ways.
First of all, he reversed the growing tide of federalization which Yeltsin had
allowed and used for electoral support. He cracked down on Chechnya, the
oligarchs and any aspiring political opposition and unified the country around his
leadership.24
Similar changes took place in Turkey after the 2002 elections. The Turkish
electorate, weary of long years of unsatisfactory economic performance, and
suffering from a severely fragmented political scene, voted for a single party
government, the Justice and Development Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Erdoğan, liberal in his economic and foreign policy, and, to begin with,
unsure of his party’s likely popularity, did not have any alternative to the economic
reform package that had been formulated and agreed with the IMF during
the previous government. Political stability has greatly helped economic
improvement and Erdoğan has even been able to proceed with the long delayed
reforms required for membership of the EU. Erdoğan’s primary message
to the electorate was similar to Putin’s: a better life and a stronger Turkey in
the international arena. Economic prosperity occupied an important place on
Erdoğan’s agenda.25
The evident shift in the foreign policy of both countries came from a
recognition that regional power would come from prosperity that clearly
depended on cooperation. Strong leadership that is in favour of a functioning
market economy mattered.
23An assessment of the manifesto can be found at: ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/
604352.stm. .
24M. Freedman and H. Brown, ‘Energy Tsar; Vladimir Putin is using Gazprom, and its monster
reserves, to remake Russia. Should you own a piece of it?’, Forbes, 178(2), 2006, accessed at the EBSCO
Host on 16 February 2008.



































Another noteworthy change concerned military threat perceptions. Throughout
the 1990s, Turkey desired the removal of Russian military bases in the South
Caucasus that could be used to de-stabilize Turkey’s neighbours. Turkey even
faced outright threats from Russia when she was on the brink of intervening in
the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh.26 All these
fears were dissipated by the turn of the millennium. Cooperation followed.
In 2001, the Black Shore littoral states, a Turkish initiative, established
BLACKSEAFOR in Istanbul. A multi-national search and rescue initiative was
followed by Operation Black Sea Harmony which was intended specifically to
deter terrorist activities in the Black Sea.27
In January 2002, the Russian Chief of Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, visited Turkey
and a military cooperation treaty was signed in which both states agreed to put
down the operations of terrorist organizations in their respective territories that
could threaten the other. Lists of suspects were exchanged in an effort to crack
down on the illegal activities of pro-Chechen and pro-Kurdish organizations.
At the same time, the Turkish Chief of Staff declared that the Russian presence in
the Southern Caucasus was no longer considered a threat.28
The search for energy security, environmentalism and the rise of natural gas
Rising global oil demand, concern over the adequacy, reliability and pricing
(costs) of energy supplies, and the associated environmental implications
(greenhouse gas emissions) occupy the state and business agendas of developed
and developing countries alike. States face an increasingly challenging and
complex set of trade-offs in their quest for energy security.29
In the last two decades, natural gas has been widely introduced as a substitute
for the oil used in industrial consumption. It is cheaper and environmentally less
hazardous. The share of natural gas in total world energy consumption is forecast
to climb from the current 23 per cent to 28 per cent by 2025. The recent EU
attempt to liberalize the electricity and natural gas markets may marginally
increase the use of natural gas for industrial and household consumption.30
However, the market structure for natural gas is very different from crude oil
because it is very expensive and difficult to transport. LNG (liquefied natural gas)
provides an option for shipping but even that requires a complex supply chain
26D. Sezer, ‘Turkish–Russian relations a decade later: from adversity to managed competition’,
Perceptions, March–May 2001, pp. 79–98; D. Sezer, ‘Turkish–Russian relations: the challenges of
reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership’, Turkish Studies, 1(1), Spring 2000,
p. 66.
27For further details of the range of BLACKSEAFOR activities you can visit the website: ,http://
www.blackseafor.org/Kurulus_Ana.asp. .
28G. Singh, ‘Russian bear calls on gray wolf’, The Asian Times, accessible at the following website:
,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FH28Ag01.html. , accessed on 8 January 2008;
I. Torbakov, ‘A new security arrangement takes shape in the South Caucasus’, accessible at the
following website: ,http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article¼71. , accessed on 8 January 2008.
29F. Verrastro and S. Ladislaw, ‘Providing energy security in an interdependent world’,
The Washington Quarterly, 30(4), Autumn 2007, p. 95.
30‘The future of gas: will really meet expectation’. Study Paper prepared for the Clingendael































which adds significantly to the costs of transport. Therefore, without a given
market and long-term contract, marketing of natural gas is almost impossible.
The whole chain of supply forces suppliers and consumers into a long-term mutual
relationship of dependence. For the supplier, the demand is crucial to invest in field
development and transport facilities. On the demand side, in order to mitigate
technical or political risks the consumers pursue policies that primarily consist of a
healthy energy balance and diversification of energy sources.31
The changing features of the energy market are also significant for the
Turkish–Russian relationship from both demand and supply side. Russia
possesses the globe’s largest natural gas reserves. In Turkey, while natural gas
consumption has boomed, the use of alternative fuels, diversification of resources
and energy conservation has become a top priority issue for energy policy. The
Russian Federation emerged as the primary supplier to Turkey of natural gas and
to a lesser extent of crude oil and coal. But the search for alternatives is vigorous.
Trade and energy: primary drivers?
Trade
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by a terrible collapse of the Russian
economy, especially with the introduction of Gaidar’s reform programme, which is
well remembered as ‘shock therapy’. The Russian economy passed through a long
and wrenching period of depression. According to the official Russian statistics
from 1990 to the end of 1995 the Russian GDP declined by roughly 50 per cent. Many
industries were drained of investment funds and had to cease operations.32
At the initial stages of the crisis even basic consumer goods disappeared from
the market. The Russian industrial collapse went hand in hand with a booming
shuttle trade from Turkey. The shuttle trade owed its resilience to the deep impact
it had on the Russian economy and its golden days lasted until the late 1990s.
It provided many employment opportunities to low-income Russians, effectively
delivering a flood of cheap goods to financially depressed Russian consumers.
Russian legislation was arranged favourably to encourage such trade, granting
many tax exemptions.33
In the second half of the 1990s, particularly towards the end, shuttle trade
with Turkey started losing its initial vigour. This was because, first of all,
competing supplier markets emerged and started carving up the Turkish place in
the Russian markets. The most noticeable impact was from China and the
United Arab Emirates. Then with the looming crisis in August 1998, the
purchasing power of Russians decreased significantly. Lastly, but probably
the most decisive factor, upon the insistence of the IMF, the Russian Federation
changed the customs legislation to limit the amount of shuttle trade. Currently, it
is estimated to have stabilized at around $2–4 billion annually.34
31Ibid., p. 8.
32D. E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia, Public Affairs, New York, 2003,
pp. 178–208.
33M. Ellman, ‘The Russian economy under El’tsin’, Europe–Asia Studies, 52(8), December 2000,
p. 1418. For an assessment of the shuttle trade figures and prospects, visit: ,http://www.rusyaofisi.
com/kargo.htm. .
34H. Selcuk, Turkiye–Rusya Ekonomik Iliskileri, Iletisim Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2005, pp. 60–64.






























With the rejuvenation of Russian industrial performance, it would be naive to
expect the shuttle trade to have a bright future. The World Trade Organization
negotiations with Russia and the determination of the Russian authorities to end
the unregistered economy dealt a heavy blow to the prospects of the shuttle
trade. The controls at the border points continue to be stricter and legislative
loops are being filled in recent years. The volume of shuttle trade is most likely to
retreat to negligible levels by 2015.35
Another issue worth noting is the performance of the Turkish construction
sector in Russia and the booming tourism. The Turkish construction sector placed
itself strategically in Russia before the break up of the USSR thanks to the terms of
the first gas sales agreement. Turkish construction contractors, since the early
1990s, have completed various projects in Russia totalling $20 billion, one-fifth of
this amount during the late Soviet period.36 There are good prospects in the
construction sector as the infrastructure and housing needs in Russia will
continue to grow and require $360 billion worth of investment in the next
decade.37
However, this is a sector where the Turkish contractors have increasingly
started to face tough competition from Eastern European and Chinese
contractors. According to the statistics provided by the Russian Construction
Platform the revenues have stabilized at around $2.5 billion annually.38 It will
require a great effort to protect even those levels in the near future.
Tourism is another area where the number of visitors, in particular from
Russia, has grown considerably in the last decade. Russian tourists are second
only to Germans in numbers. Starting from 0.6 million in 1996, the number of
Russian visitors reached 2 million in 2007. Turkey each year on average attracts
10 per cent of all Russian tourists, but the statistics show that the Far East has
been taking a larger chunk of the marginal demand from Russia. According to
TurkStat, 2 million Russian tourists generated revenue of roughly $1.4 billion in
2007.39
The volume of trade between Russia and Turkey throughout the 1990s,
outlined in Table 1, remained relatively stable.
The trade volume reached unprecedented, and maybe even unpredicted,
levels in the first of decade of the 21st century. Growing volumes of exports
combined with soaring prices of energy sales seem to be the driving force behind
the shining trade data.
In 2006, Russia delivered nearly 20 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas to
Turkey. This amount represented a 50-fold increase in volume since the start of
the natural gas trade in 1987. It is exactly two-thirds of the total Turkish natural
gas consumption today.40 Add to this Turkey’s annual average imports of around
35For an estimate on the shuttle trade you can visit the website: ,http://www.rusyaofisi.com/
kargo.htm. .
36H. Güneş, ‘İnşaatta Türklerin küresel rekabeti’, Milliyet, 6 December 2007.
37‘İnşaatçılarımızın Rusya’daki geleceği’, interview with Turkish Trade Attaché to Moscow Bahri
Can Çalıcıoğlu, available at: ,http://www.insaat.ru/content/view/113/28/. .
38The summary table providing the volume of works completed by Turkish contractors in Russia is
provided on the following website: ,http://www.insaat.ru/content/view/94/34/. .
39Statistical Year Book, Turkish Statistical Institute, 2006, p. 166.
40A good overview of the natural gas trade statistics can be found on the following website:































15–20 per cent of crude oil needs (on a range of 4–6 million tonnes),41 the energy
invoice from Russia reached roughly $9 billion, almost half of the bilateral trade
volume, which was about $20.7 billion in 2006. In 2007, the Russian energy bill is
estimated at about $12 billion.42
If we look into the details of the trade data in 2006 we may understand the
degree of interdependence better. The share of imports from Russia is almost
13 per cent of overall Turkish imports, marking Turkey’s largest imports from any
single country, followed by 11 per cent from Germany. This amount is 6 per cent
of total Russian exports. Turkish exports to Russia constitute around 2 per cent of
total Russian imports. Turkey’s exports to Russia, although at historic heights,
constitute only 3.7 per cent of its total exports, with an annual $3226 million in
2006. The bilateral trade data should be seen in the light of Turkey’s overall trade
balance. In 2006, overall Turkish exports were $85 billion and overall imports
were $137 billion. Table 2 provides an overview of the trade situation.43
The figures in 2006 show that Russia has not become a significant export
market for Turkish goods. Although in absolute terms the volume of trade has
grown significantly, in relative terms Russia’s value as an export market
decreased slightly. The value of Turkish exports to Russia is comparable to those
to Spain or Iraq.44 For Russia, however, Turkey has acquired its place in the
top ranks as a significant export market, comparable to Germany or Italy in
volume. Its importance and share will increase in view of the energy prices and
the Turkish lust for energy.



























1992 438.4 1040 2601 1478
1993 499 1542 21043 2041
1994 820.1 1045 2225 1865
1995 1238.2 2082 2844 3320
1996 1494 6.43 2.19 1900 4.35 2.10 2407 3394
1997 2056 7.83 2.86 2174 4.47 2.50 2118 4230
1998 1348 4.99 2.32 2152 4.69 2.89 2804 3500
1999 589 2.21 1.49 2374 5.83 3.14 21785 2963
aData provided by the Foreign Trade Centre of Turkey.
41The information on energy balance of Turkey can be reached at: ,http://www.epdk.gov.tr/
lisans/petrol/petrolbilgisistemi/tupras/ek6.htm. , accessed on 16 January 2008.
42Author’s personal communication with the State Pipeline Corporation and the Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey, 11 January 2008.
43Data provided by the Foreign Trade Centre of Turkey has been jointly used by the information
available on the following website: ,http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/print.
asp?file¼bal_of_paym_an_06_e.htm. .
44The data is available on the Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade website: ,http://www.dtm.gov.
tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action¼detayrk&yayinID¼1116&icerikID¼1225&dil¼TR. , accessed on
28 December 2007.






























We can draw the conclusion that Russo-Turkish trade relations will deepen
but not to the advantage of Turkey. Turkey’s dependence on Russia for energy
resources, via contracts and pipelines, cannot be easily reversed, while the bill to
be paid continues to soar. This fact has not gone unnoticed in Turkey and the
search for other and preferably cheaper alternatives, and suppliers, is full steam
ahead, including mobilization of alternative (hydro, wind, solar) and nuclear
energy resources.45 Turkey announced its plans to build a nuclear power plant in
the second half of 2008.46
Moreover, it remains a question how symmetrically the strategic dependence
created by the natural gas trade affects political relations. In a theoretical case of
serious political crisis, Russia, with current energy prices, may well absorb the
impact of a failed Blue Stream investment or a 1–2 per cent decrease in its export
revenues. The only visible consequence could be the damage inflicted on its
reputation as a reliable supplier. However, in such a situation Turkish industry
and citizens are bound to face a deep energy shock. So while it is true that energy
trade is adding more zeros to the trade figures, it is disputable, how such a trade
relationship can be the foundation of a better political relationship. If the closer
political relationship is a result of growing trade then the argument can be that
Turkey, in anticipation of severe consequences, has decided to cooperate with
Russia. The fundamental driver of Turkish–Russian relations seems to be
something else, not easily explained by the trade inter-dependence.
Lastly, the trade figures, rather than indicating a developing partnership,
indeed, may point to a future bottleneck and competition. Turkey’s search for
new and cheaper energy supplies has already triggered a managed competition
with respect to new pipeline routes. The growing Turkish and European demand
for energy in the next decade will be the decisive factor in determining the future
energy transport routes. Turkey’s strategic interest in becoming an energy hub
and transit country clashes with Russian interests.



























2000 644 2.30 1.43 3887 7.16 3.70 23243 4531
2001 923 3.00 1.72 3436 8.60 3.38 22513 4359
2002 1168 3.32 1.92 3863 7.58 3.63 22695 5031
2003 1363 2.90 1.82 5420 7.88 4.03 24057 6783
2004 1851 2.94 1.92 9009 9.27 4.92 27158 10,860
2005 2377 3.2 1.8 12,906 11.02 5.02 210,529 15,283




3824 4.4 18,603 13.6 214,779 22,427
aRussia country profile, report prepared by Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, DG
Agreements.
45A. Demirbaş, ‘Turkey’s renewable energy policy’, Energy Sources, Part A, 2006, p. 662.
































Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia faced serious problems
on the resource development front. The sources of financing for the industry,
pouring at an accelerated rate in the 1980s, vanished. There was simply no money
around, not even to conduct the simplest field maintenance operations. The oil
sector, whose costs of production rose steadily after the end of 1970s, and
desperately in need of investment, found itself in a protracted crisis that resulted
in a massive decrease in output, halved from 600 million tonnes in less than five
years. Gas production, flat at more or less 500 bcm, was not hit as severely by
investment cuts but suffered from non-payments from domestic customers.
Exports were the only reasonable activity to generate profits for an ailing
industry.47
Another complicating factor for the Russian oil and gas industry was the new
political map emerging after the break up of the Soviet Union, which led to new
transit relations. These routes were secure and granted during Soviet times.
The very same routes emerged as potential bottlenecks and in some cases overt
security problems for Russia. Byelorussia, Ukraine and the Baltic States on the
immediate Western borders as well as Romania, Hungary and Poland on the
Western routes moved from being constituent republics or orbit states to new
jurisdictions which would have to be dealt with.48
An associated issue was the shift of markets for Russia. Throughout the 1990s,
Russian exports to international markets beyond the former USSR steadily
increased, while those to former Soviet republics contracted dramatically. As higher
volumes had to be transported westward, a much larger proportion of the oil
exports were directed to Russia’s major port on the Black Sea, Novorossiysk. With
the changing export destinations, the Russian oil industry also faced infrastructural
capacity shortages in the 1990s, particularly oil export terminals.49
The change in export routes meant that ever increasing numbers of oil and
LNG tankers had to cross the Turkish straits. When Turkey, quite reasonably,
decided to stiffen the safety measures, it had an impact on the rate of passage.
Although the Montreux Convention of 1936 guarantees the innocent passage
rights to all parties, increasing tanker traffic in the Bosphorus has forced Turkish
authorities to take some extra measures unilaterally. This aimed to slow down the
tanker traffic with time and quality of passage limitations. One can easily see
hundreds of oil tankers waiting at both ends of the Bosphorus, for their turn to be
granted passage right.
Russian oil exporters had to search for new export routes and means, which
triggered a struggle for more economical and secure export routes.50
The competitive struggle not only included Russia but all former Soviet states
that were endowed with hydrocarbon riches, particularly the Caspian states such
as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Moreover, the transit countries
47J. D. Grace, Russian Oil Supply: Performance and Prospects, Oxford University Press, New York,
2005, p. 88.
48‘Energy policies of the Russian Federation’, IEA Report, July 1995, counter-signed by the Russian
Government as a part of Joint Declaration of Co-operation, p. 175.
49Ibid., p. 179.
50N. Pamir, ‘Enerji Arz Güvenliği ve Türkiye’, Stratejik Analiz, p. 22.






























like Poland, Ukraine,51 Romania and Bulgaria (and even Greece) had a role to
play in pipeline politics.52
Russia, in search of political leverage and higher profits, aspired to control the
resource flows out of competing markets, namely, the Caspian. On the other side,
Turkey, in association with the USA, tried to divert oil and gas resource flows
from Russia. This was considered to provide an effective means of breaking the
Russian economic and political domination in the region. As a part of this policy,
Turkey pursued a dynamic role in development of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
(BTC) crude oil pipeline as the main export pipeline from the Caspian region.53
In any investment decision, political stability and security play a pivotal role
and pipelines are no exception. Although many other political explanations can
be provided, the conflict in Georgia (i.e. South Ossetia, Javakheti, Abkhazia) or
in Dagestan and Chechnya obviously affected the planning of pipelines in the
region. The northern Caucasus routes through Dagestan looked like a war zone
and not worth investing in. Similarly, in the early 1990s PKK terrorism peaked
in Turkey, an issue that was consistently used against the construction of
the BTC pipeline. Both states, in expectation of gaining an advantage in the
pipeline race, turned a blind eye to dissident elements in each other’s
territory.54
The first round of the game, mostly related to crude oil, was over when the
BTC pipeline successfully became operational in 2006 with a capacity of
50 million tonnes per annum. In turn the Russian-backed Tengiz–Novorossiysk
pipeline (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) was also operational as of 2003, with a
crude oil transportation capacity of 22 million tonnes per annum (eventually
reaching up to 67 million tonnes). The pipeline derby, on deciding the main
export pipelines out of the Caspian region, was settled.55
With the development of more oil and gas resources in the Caspian region,
future rounds in the game will be on expansion of existing export capacities
and development of new routes. In this respect, the Kashagan oil field
(off-shore Kazakhstan), developed by a consortium led by the Italian giant
ENI,56 will play an important role. The prospects of this field, 1.2 million barrels
per day in 2015, have already initiated a new search for routes that bypass the
Turkish straits. The recent Russian activism on the Burgas–Alexandroupolis
51M. M. Balmaceda, ‘Gas, oil and the linkages between domestic and foreign policies: the case of
Ukraine’, Europe–Asia Studies, 50(2), March 1998, p. 258.
52G. Winrow, ‘Turkey and the east–west gas transportation corridor’, Turkish Studies, 5(2), Summer
2004, pp. 23–42.
53F. Hill, ‘Seismic shifts in Eurasia: the changing relationship between Turkey and Russia and its
implications for the South Caucasus’, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 3(3),
September 2003, p. 64.
54D. Sezer, ‘Turkish–Russian relations a decade later: from adversity to managed competition’,
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 6(1), March–May 2001, p. 82.
55Further details of projects are available on the following websites: for the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium ,http://www.cpc.ru/. ; for the BTC ,http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.
do?categoryId¼9006669&contentId¼7014358. .
56In January 2008, ENI agreed to sell an 8.5 per cent stake to KazakMunaiGaz for $1.78 billion and
to pay additional royalties in the range of $2.5–4.5 billion. ENI will become co-operator along with
ExxonMobil, Sheel and Total after 2011, the estimated date of first production. Business Week, Issue































pipeline and Turkish preference for the Samsun–Ceyhan should be seen in this
framework.57
In 2007, Russia signed a deal with Bulgaria and Greece to construct the
Trans-Balkan Pipeline (Burgas in Bulgaria to Alexandroupolis in Greece) to
provide an opportunity to carry more volumes of crude oil while bypassing
the Turkish straits. After the deal, it remained a question mark how the
Samsun–Ceyhan (a pipeline connecting the Black Sea to the existing oil terminal
in the Mediterranean) crude oil pipeline, Turkey’s preferred option for
bypassing the straits, was going to have a sufficient amount of crude to justify
the investment.58
Regarding natural gas, Russia’s formidable giant Gazprom, though still a
monopoly and inefficient, provides most of the gas to former Soviet states, to
central Europe, as well as 25 per cent of the needs of Western Europe. Since the
management change in 2001, when Putin’s aide Alexei Miller took over, the profit
of Gazprom increased from $440 million to $7.5 billion, on an annual turnover of
$42 billion. In a decade, its market value is expected reach $1 trillion.59
Gazprom is a joint-stock company but during Putin’s era it has become an
arm of the state policy. The Russian elite, and in particular Putin, recognize the
importance of the natural gas industry, which provides both subsidized gas to
the nation and as much as 20 per cent of ($77 billion) its annual tax revenue. Oil
and gas together account for 60 per cent of Russian export revenues ($180 billion)
whereas all raw materials and semi-finished materials make up 80 per cent of all
export revenues ($240 billion).60
Gazprom has been very aggressive and is committed to increasing its exports
rapidly in the next decade. It has been very active in Europe, developing many
partnerships in Germany, France and Austria. It announced deals with Japan,
Iran and even China. By the end of next decade it expects to send LNG from
reserves near the Barents Sea to ports in the USA. It cleverly played on the
booming natural gas demand and energy security concerns of Turkey and
proposed a direct pipeline link, avoiding any transit country, between Turkey
and Russia, the Blue Stream. In partnership with ENI, Gazprom invested
around $4 billion, in the 1213 km natural gas pipeline (NGPL) project connecting
Russia to Turkey underneath the Black Sea.61
The controversy is that, despite the ambitious marketing attack, Gazprom’s
output in the best case scenario may rise modestly in view of the decline in the
57J. Gorvett, ‘Pipeline, pipeline, who’s got the pipeline? Turkey’s quest for energy significance’,
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 26(8), November 2007, accessed at the EBSCO Host on
12 January 2008.
58‘Samsun–Ceyhan’da İlk Kazma Bugün’, Radikal, 24 April 2007, available at the website:
,http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno¼21925. .
59M. Freedman and H. Brown, ‘Energy Tsar; Vladimir Putin is using Gazprom, and its monster
reserves, to remake Russia. Should you own a piece of it?’, Forbes, 178(2), 2006 accessed at the EBSCO
Host on 16 February 2008.
60P. Oppenheimer and S. Maslichenko, ‘Energy and the economy: an introduction’, in M. Ellman
(ed.), Russia’s Oil and Natural Gas: Bonanza or Curse, Anthem Press, New York, 2006, pp. 15–23. For
more information see the World Bank’s statistics, available at the following website: ,http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/macromay2006.pdf. ; see
also the Russian Central Bank statistics which are available at: ,http://www.cbr.ru/eng/
statistics/credit_statistics/bp_2006_e.pdf. .
61J. P. Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 24–25.






























giant Urengoi, Yamburg and Medvezhe natural gas fields.62 The Russian gas
sector, monopolistic in structure and heavily regulated by subsidized prices, can
only with difficulty deliver future output and export growth.63 The decline can
be off-set either by developing greenfield projects or by non-Gazprom sources of
supply, both within Russia and abroad, a fact increasingly recognized even in the
official government projections. In this respect, the supply of Central Asian gas
under agreements concluded with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan
are crucial.64 In late 2007, the Russian Federation unveiled a new NGPL that will
carry Turkmen and Uzbek gas to the West.65
Turkey could have been content with Russia as its primary supplier.
However, the Turkish economy, since its resurgence in 2001, has suffered the
effects of increasing oil prices. The price of natural gas quadrupled (from
7.62 cents/cm3 in 2000 to around 38 cents/cm3 in 2007). The high natural gas
prices had an effect on electricity prices, created inflationary pressure and led to
ever widening current account deficit for the country. In the last days of 2007,
electricity prices had to be increased by 19 per cent. The Turkish willingness to
tackle the rising natural gas prices is evident in the recent rush for mobilizing
alternative resources (build–operate type hydro-electric power dams and
bio-diesel) and determination to build nuclear power generation capability.
Turkey also accelerated its efforts to become an energy transit country as well
as an energy hub for the region. Turkey’s energy transit strategy largely depends
on availability of oil and gas resources to fill the lines and feasible investment
schemes to attract grand scale international financing from investors, not to
mention the required political dynamism to steer the project development stage.
At the moment, Turkey seems in part to have all of the prerequisites to facilitate
these investments. Also with current energy prices, Turkey’s prospects for
becoming a transit country are better. Higher prices shorten pay back periods and
justify costly construction projects.66
There are five important projects constituting the core of Turkish transit
strategy, two crude oil pipelines and three NGPLs. The essence of the strategy is
to reach and carry, initially, the Caspian and eventually the Middle Eastern
hydrocarbons to the European markets.
The crude oil pipelines, namely, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Samsun–Ceyhan,
are destined to reach the Turkish town of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean, which
has already become an international oil terminal with a storage capacity of
around 2 million tonnes of crude oil and two loading jetties. The BTC crude oil
pipeline became operational in May 2006. The development of Samsun–Ceyhan
project is in progress.
62V. Milov, ‘Russian energy sector and its international implication’. Discussion Paper prepared for
the Institute of Energy Policy, pp. 10–14.
63R. Ahrend, ‘Sustaining growth in a hydrocarbon based economy’, in M. Ellman (ed.), Russia’s Oil
and Natural Gas: Bonanza or Curse, Anthem Press, New York, 2006, pp. 112–114.
64R. Ahrend and W. Tompson, ‘Unnatural monopoly: the endless wait for gas sector reform in
Russia’, Europe–Asia Studies, 57(6), September 2005, pp. 805–807.
65‘Russia to sign Turkmenistan pipeline deal soon’, New York Times, 23 November 2007, available at
,http://www.cnbc.com/id/21935750. .
66C. Pala, ‘Turkey as an energy bridge between east and west’, Insight Turkey, 7(4),































The NGPLs are Nabucco, the Turkey–Greece–Italy interconnector (TGI) and
the Shah Deniz. The Shah Deniz pipeline was commissioned in July 2007. This
has already given an opening to Azeri and Turkmen gas.67 The technical capacity
of the Shah Deniz Pipeline, 42 inch, is sufficient to handle up to 17 bcm of
deliveries and can be easily expanded for larger volumes. The Turkey–Greece
interconnector pipeline, though smaller in volume, became operational in 2007.
The Nabucco pipeline is the centrepiece of the natural gas transit strategy, a
trunk line starting in the eastern Turkish city of Erzurum and stretching around
4000 km to Austria, crossing en route Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.
The technical capacity of the pipeline is 31 bcm per year. Recently, there have
been many positive developments in favour of the project. Germany’s energy
giant RWE has formally participated in the project. In addition Turkey came
forward with some alternative investment scenarios to shorten the route and
downsize the required investment.68
However, there are also many challenges ahead. Whereas Gas de France has
shown interest to participate in the project, the Turkish government seems
hesitant to grant such access easily, in view of the French position on Turkey’s
accession to the EU. Gas de France, in response, started talks with Gazprom and
MOL over development of the South Stream project, another pipeline connecting
Russia underneath the Black Sea to Hungary to supply natural gas to Europe.
It is clear that the pipeline politics involves many layers of interest, acting
sometimes controversially and it is very difficult to foresee an outcome. So
contrary to what is argued by many, Turkey’s transit strategy cannot rely on
resources from Russia for re-export to third markets. It is against the very
rationale of the whole venture. In fact, the issue of providing the Nabucco
pipeline with Russian natural gas was discussed at the early phases of project
development. Gazprom was willing to fill the Nabucco pipeline with Russian
natural gas but did not want to allow other shippers to use the pipeline. This
meant a greater share for the Russian gas in European markets. The Turkish
government, keen to use Nabucco in supporting its EU bid, refused the deal.69
Moreover, Russia, possessing 30 per cent of the globe’s natural gas reserves,
has the capability as well as the will to preserve and preferably increase its
already substantial share (30–35 per cent) in the European natural gas markets.
There is no commercial interest for Russia to see Turkey promoting competition
in association with regional countries. As explained before, Gazprom needs the
very same resources in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran for its
own supply strategies for the next decade.70
In the meantime, Turkey’s only commercial chance for becoming a transit
country in natural gas relies on its ability to reach the politically and/or
geographically locked countries like Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
In August 2007, Turkey, despite US protests, signed a memorandum of
67Yet, Turkmenistan appears to be satisfied with the recent gas sales agreement with Gazprom,
offering Turkmenistan $100 at the well head (see A. Malashenko, ‘Where will Turkmen gas flow?’,
WPS: Central Asia News, 6 April 2007).
68One of the proposals includes providing the existing space in Turkish pipeline infrastructure for
the use of Nabucco shippers and starting the construction of Nabucco pipeline in Western Turkey.
69‘EU energy coordinator to press Turkey on Nabucco’, Turkish Daily News, 12 February 2008.
70G. Winrow, ‘Geopolitics and energy security in the wider Black Sea region’, Southeast European
and Black Sea Studies, 7(2), June 2007, p. 223.






























understanding to develop the two gas pipelines from the South Pars fields (one of
the world’s greatest untapped gas reserves in the Persian Gulf), to transport Iranian
gas for re-sale to Europe. Iran also dropped its objection to transport of Turkmen
gas via the new pipeline.71 Still, the question remains as to how Turkey will
overcome the extremely difficult technical field conditions and raise the required
$8–10 billion financing for the project under stiff US diplomatic blockage.72
In view of all these alternative projects competing for the same resources for
throughput it is difficult to foresee how Turco-Russian cooperation will flourish
in the energy field. The cooperation in natural gas can hardly go one step further
if Turkey is to promote energy security as one of its foreign-policy priorities.
The crude oil transit projects bypassing the Turkish straits are not independent of
each other: one’s success marks another’s failure. It can even be expected that the
next decade will be marked by competition though restrained by the current
political and economic framework.
The future of Turco-Russian partnership
The oil and gas sector has been the power base of Putin’s domestic and
international strength.73 We could safely assume that any development which
could preclude Russian resource development and exports is a policy priority.
Hence, Russia has been cautious and coercive, to maintain the stability and
control of its transit export routes as well as to keep the emerging competing
markets from the Caspian region under control.74
In this respect, Turkey’s aspiration to emerge as an energy hub and transit
country does not serve the Russian interests. This fact already is evident in
Russia’s recent push towards some deals to counter Turkish transit plans.
So, the future energy policies do not seem to be an area where the two states
will increase their cooperation and come forward with a breakthrough. The trade
in energy will not grow and the overall trade figures may stabilize at around
$25–30 billion.
However, competition in the energy field does not necessarily mean that
political relations will worsen. One obvious factor in the Russo–Turkish
cooperation in recent times has been a weakening in the US–Turkish
relationship. The discontent with US policies in the Black Sea and the Middle
East region has provided sufficient stimulus for the growing regional
cooperation. Evidently, the US recently decided to give priority to her old
ally’s needs, or at least to take them seriously. Would Turkey in that event return
to the older pattern of ‘the great game’?
In a sense Turkey’s dependence on the West has increased—roughly a quarter
of the Turkish economy is now tied up with international trade, and the value of
the currency still depends on IMF support. This of course in the longer term
means America and Europe, not Russia. Yet, the opening Russian relationship has
shown at least the glimpse of an alternative, if not the happy Eurasian
71‘İran’la tarihi gaz anlaşması’, News article on NTV MSNBC, 14 July 2007.
72Interview with Ali Yasar Hafiz, Director General of NUROL Energy, former Coordinator at the
State Pipeline Corporation.
73L. Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2005, pp. 328–335.
74A. C. Lynch, How Russia is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development, Cambridge































togetherness. The pragmatic approach and growth-oriented economic policies of
both leaders combined with the already substantial volume of trade indicate that
the Turkish–Russian relationship has reached a level that cannot be reversed.
Any political matter between the two nations cannot ignore these powerful
interests.
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